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THE DYNAMIC OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE OECD ANTI-
BRIBERY COLLABORATION 
 
Lianlian Liu* 
 
ABSTRACT 
Grasping the dynamic of the institutionalization process of the anti-bribery collaboration from the FCPA to the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is critical for the next step of analyzing the actual performance of these laws.  
Previous works, grounded in realist ideology, often reduce the dynamic process to a question of states’ free will and 
rational responses to expected payoffs in relative legislative strategies.  This realist approach offers only speculative 
and inaccurate explanations that cannot sustain an understanding of the operation of the anti-bribery collaboration at 
successive stages.  Instead, this study employs a historical approach, stressing how decision makers were 
constrained by existing and evolving institutions through analyzing the process of intertwined interactions among 
involved political parties, and concludes that the institutionalization process is composed of a sequence of 
unavoidable choices by decision makers in a concrete, historical context.  A lawmaking game among rational parties 
in an evolving context may plausibly result in altruistic consequences.  
Key Words:  institutionalization; OECD anti-bribery collaboration; realist analysis; historical analysis; coordination 
game; moral boundaries of law; institutional path dependence. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
At the outset of this Article, there are two critical concepts to be defined.  The first is “transnational bribery.”  
Transnational bribery1 generally refers to one country’s nationals or entities paying bribes to foreign public officials 
in international business transactions.  The acts often take place in the home country of bribe payees, and the bribe 
payers often, although not always, seek to gain or retain business opportunities.
2
  Transnational bribery used to be a 
legal business activity that enjoyed tax deductions.
3
  The transformation of its legal status from a normal business 
activity to a criminal offense was a recent event.
4
   
The second concept is the institutionalization of the global anti-bribery collaboration.  In the discourse of this 
Article I refer to the establishment of central, national, and international laws, which criminalized transnational 
bribery.  This institutional establishment took place between 1977 and the early 2000s, marked by the creation of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Anti-Bribery Convention (the Convention).
5
  In 1977, the U.S. enacted the FCPA, which, for the first time in history, 
criminalized acts of transnational bribery.
6
  In 1997, major industrialized countries joined the U.S. and established 
the Convention.
7
  Among a series of similarly themed anti-bribery agreements established during this period, the 
Convention is the most influential and enforceable.
8
  It is also the first and only agreement that places central 
attention on the supply side control of transnational bribery.
9
  Current anti-bribery scholarship generally regards the 
                                                             
*Lianlian Liu (Renmin University of China, LL.B., 2006; Peking University, Master of Criminal Law, 2008; The 
Chinese University of Hong Kong, Ph.D. in Transnational Bribery Regulation) served as an Editor of criminal law works at the 
Legal Publishing House of China until 2011. 
1 Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, 37 I.L.M. 1, 4 (1998) [hereinafter Convention] (defining transnational bribery as acts of 
“any person intentionally to offer, promise[,] or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through 
intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting 
in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of 
international business.”).   
2 See ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 57–59, 62–63 (2013). 
3 LUCINDA A. LOW, THE U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION: THE GLOBALIZATION OF ANTICORRUPTION STANDARDS 
1-2 (2006), available at http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/2599.pdf. 
4 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).   
5 Convention, supra note 1. 
6 Ajani Harris, The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on American Business from 1977-2010 (Apr. 25, 2011) 
(unpublished senior thesis, Claremont McKenna College) [hereinafter Harris], available at 
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1177&context=cmc_theses. 
7  See Christopher K. Carlberg, A Truly Level Playing Field for International Business: Improving the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery Using Clear Standards, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 95, 98 (2003). 
8 See A. Keith Thompson, Does Anti-Corruption Legislation Work?, 7 WORLD CUSTOMS J. 39, 41 (2013).  
9 See MARK PIETH, THE OCED CONVENTION ON BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY 19–21 (Mark Pieth et al. eds., 2d ed. 2013).   
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Convention as the landmark legal instrument of the global campaign against transnational bribery.
10
  
The enactment of the FCPA and the formation of the OECD Convention created two historical events suitable 
for theoretical analysis.  First, because the FCPA unprecedentedly criminalized transnational bribery and relied on 
supply-side control of corruption and extraterritorial enforcement of criminal law, its wisdom was initially 
questioned.
11
  Academic work in anti-corruption conducted before the formation of the Convention placed central 
attention on this issue.
12
  Since the Convention’s entrance into force in 1999, opinion shifted toward approval of the 
FCPA approach.
13
  Academic focus shifted to the practical effects of the Convention in controlling transnational 
bribery.  Accordingly, the central mission of present-day work in anti-corruption is to provide policy 
recommendations to improve enforcement of the Convention around the world.
14
       
In order to offer successful policy recommendations for the collective enforcement against transnational bribery, 
we need to grasp operational factors of law enforcement at a systemic level.  An even more fundamental prerequisite 
is to grasp the central dynamic behind the build up of institutions.  The underlying forces of institutionalization that 
drove the process forward identify not only the target problem to be solved, but also the orientation of those 
established laws.  In order to predict state compliance with the Convention and address any impediments, we need to 
understand the dynamic of the institutionalization in the first place.           
However, current academic literature fails to give an adequate explanation of this topic.  Far too many times 
previous works have only recounted the story of the institutionalization of the global anti-bribery collaboration, from 
the enactment of the FCPA to the formation of the Convention.
15
  Within these discourses, the question of how 
institutions were built up was neatly undercut into the question of why states chose to legislate.  The logic behind the 
buildup and incremental evolution of institutions approximates to the logic of free will choices of states in separate 
informational environments.  
                                                             
 10 See id. at 8–9. 
 11 See Thomas Pletscher & April Tash, Beyond the 1997 Bribery Convention: The Business and Industry Advisory 
Committee’s Work on Corruption, in NO LONGER BUSINESS AS USUAL: FIGHTING BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION 175, 176–77 (2000). 
12 See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaty Double Jeopardy: The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the FCPA, 
73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1321, 1351 (2012) (explaining that the convention’s supply side coverage does not furnish security against 
double jeopardy issues). 
13 See Joseph W. Yockey, Choosing Governance in the FCPA Reform Debate, 38 J. CORP. L. 325, 338–40 (2013). 
14 See generally OECD, OECD Working Group on Bribery: Annual Report on Activities Undertaken in 2012 (2013) 
[hereinafter Annual Report] (reporting from all the members of the OECD on the promotion and compliance from the 
Convention).  
15 See, e.g., Elizabeth K. Spahn, Implementing Global Bribery Norms: From the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to the U.N. Convention Against Corruption, 23 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 1–14 (2013). 
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This standard account reflects and results from the centrality of realist thinking, which largely coincides with 
the rational choice theory in an academic analysis of international affairs.  In this analytical logic, the U.S. and other 
regulatory states are anthropomorphized.  Consciously or unconsciously, they are attributed with properties of 
natural persons such as intentions, moral sentiments, and interest rationality.  The free will of states to make policy 
choices is stressed.  In addition, the standard account also stresses the rationality of state behaviors and posits that 
they act strictly in an optimizing manner to seek maximal self-interest throughout their policy making process.  
Following this presupposed behavioral logic, previous works in rational choice tradition often start with the 
binary opposition of moral values and material interests.  These works both presume that either of these binary 
opposites has driven states, like the U.S. and its allies, to build up central anti-bribery institutions such as the FCPA 
and the Convention.  Relevant policy choices of states are then labeled as irrational or rational according to whether 
the institutional construction is consistent with a given state’s self-interest.16  Scholars that presume a commitment to 
moral values as the motive of state actors to legislate against transnational bribery would then either support the 
FCPA style approach for its moral correctness,
17
 or object to it for their pan-moralism.
18
  Another group of scholars, 
who believe self-seeking purposes motivate states to legislate, tend to rationalize the FCPA approach as a result of 
trading conflicting interests and emphasize that the FCPA is a strategy that sacrifices short-term business interests 
for superior national interests.19  
Despite the long-standing debate on state motives, either value-driven or interest-driven, and the wisdom of 
states’ policy choices, either rational or irrational, the standard interpretive approach only reflects the dominance of 
the rational choice tradition in which any explanation of state policy choices must revolve.
20
  This approach is based 
on the binary opposition of moral values and material interests and does not provide a suitable perspective.  As this 
standard approach only allows a static perspective, it is therefore ill equipped to fully explain the institutionalization 
process of the collaboration, which, in nature, is an evolutionary event.   
                                                             
16 See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis, Self-Interest and Altruism in the Deterrence of Transnational Bribery, 4 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV., 314, 340 (2002) [hereinafter Davis, Self-Interest].  See also Kevin E. Davis, Why does the United States Regulate Foreign 
Bribery: Moralism, Self-Interest, or Altruism? 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.,497, 511 (2012) [hereinafter Davis, Moralism]. 
17 See Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 257, 260 (1999). 
18  See David Kennedy, The International Anti-Corruption Campaign, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 455, 465 (1999). 
19 See William James Buchholz, A Vexing Conundrum: Bribery and Public Relations, 1-20, MADISON NJ: FAIRLEIGH 
DICKINSON UNIV. (1989), reprinted in BENTLEY U., available at http://cyber.bentley.edu/faculty/wb/printables/bribery.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2015) (originally titled A Vexing Conundrum: Bribery and Public Relations). 
20 See Kenneth W. Abbott, Enriching Rational Choice Institutionalism for the Study of International Law, 1 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 5, 10 (2007). 
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Viewed through the veil of a rational choice theory, the buildup of institutions is predefined as a story of free 
will—the rational choice of anthropomorphized states in a given informational environment.21  Research then solely 
relies on the content of established decisions, rhetoric of political leaders, and precompiled knowledge of human 
beings to speculate as to the motives of states.
22
  While the formulation of the standard account manages to explain 
the discontinuous legislative enactments (like the FCPA and the Convention) as to the results from the predefined 
behavioral logic of states, it avoids considering constraints on states’ policy choices.  Such constraints are defined by 
existing formal and informal institutions, such as the interactive mode of these parties in the negotiations which 
diverged on preferences but converged on an intention to reach a consensus.  An example of these constraints can be 
seen in the government and Congress in FCPA negotiations, and the U.S. and European governments in Convention 
negotiations.  These constraints are also defined by the incrementally evolving informal institutions, which 
continuously altered informational environments for deliberate legislative enactments across negotiations over time.    
The standard approach is a good interpretative device to motivate the latent value of society and convince 
people of the wisdom of institution building, which was important in the earlier years when people faced ideological 
obstacles to understanding the wisdom of the FCPA and the Convention.  However, it does not give a coherent and 
adequate explanation of the story of the institutionalization of the global anti-bribery collaboration.  More 
profoundly, it fails to sustain a progressive manner of understanding the operation of collaboration at successive 
stages.  After the Convention’s ratification in 1999, academic attention has shifted from the wisdom of building up 
institutions to the actual effect of these institutions on controlling transnational bribery;
23
 people need a more 
rigorous and less speculative analytical approach to analyze state compliance with the Convention.  The standard 
account, which builds theories on a set of assumptions and allocates state actors with an unchanging behavioral logic, 
is too rigescent to adapt to new academic objectives brought by variations in real circumstances.  
Based on this awareness, this Article addresses the seemingly outdated, yet unsolved, issues of the dynamic that 
governs the institutional generation and development of the global anti-bribery collaboration.  It tells a story about 
historicity and analyzes how institutionalization was driven forward by choices of state actors from a set of 
alternatives, defined by established and evolving institutional settings of society.  Methodologically, it does not take 
                                                             
21 See id. at 34. 
22 See id. at 10–15. 
23 See Anna D’Souza, The OCED Anti-Bribery Convention: Changing the Currents of Trade, 97 J. OF DEV. ECON. 73, 78 
(2012).  
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choice theory as the panacea, nor does it totally repudiate it, but rather analyzes how the continuous variations in 
institutional contexts change available choices for state actors and finally make certain legislative enactment an 
optimal strategy.  Technically, it divides the historical context into three phases:  the pre-FCPA era, the U.S.’s 
unilateral action era, and the post-Convention era.  This categorization results from the consideration that the three 
historical eras brought about three salient increases in the number of regulatory states of transnational bribery, and 
each increase reflects the substantive strategic choices of those states.  It provides the best angle to observe the 
existing state and evolution of the institutional context that underpinned deliberate legislative enactments.  
This Article proceeds as follows:  Part II analyzes how the U.S. endogenously created the FCPA in 1977 without 
the intervention of any external forces.  It explores pre-FCPA history to probe whether the FCPA was an active 
choice of U.S. legislation or an unavoidable consequence of interactions among parties in a given social context.  
Part III analyzes how the U.S. attempts to open the FCPA up for participation by other nations in the 1990s finally 
resulted in the creation of the Convention.  Similar to previous works, it highlights the central role of the U.S. in the 
formation of the Convention.  However, it repudiates the notion that there is a direct causal relationship between U.S. 
strategies and European attitude changes, and instead explores how interactions between the U.S. and European 
governments gradually altered the informational context and finally aligned the optimal choice of Europeans to that 
of the U.S.  Part IV analyzes the post-Convention era and how the OECD and existing collaborators have marketed 
the Convention norms to even more peripheral states since the 2000s.  Based on the analysis of the preceding 
sections, Part V extracts how the path dependence principle defines the trajectory of institutionalization and how key 
operative factors define the content and mode of interactions among political forces in each phase of the institutional 
buildup.  
 
II.  THE FCPA:  AN ANTI-BRIBERY LEGISLATION ENDOGENOUSLY GENERATED BY THE ECONOMIC 
CONTEXT OF THE U.S. 
This part analyzes the dynamic process behind the creation of the FCPA in the U.S. during the 1970s under the 
condition that there was no intervention of external forces.  The U.S. adopted the FCPA in 1977, which targeted 
combating transnational bribery through two channels:  stringent terms on accounting and financial control, and 
criminal liability of transnational bribery.
24
  Although all countries outlawed corruption much earlier,
25
 the FCPA is 
                                                             
24Masako N. Darrough, The FCPA and the OECD Convention: Some Lessons from the U.S. Experience, 93 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 255, 255 (2009). 
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the first legislation in history to declare bribing foreign officials as an immoral, criminal offense.
26
  For this reason, 
the FCPA was innovative and progressive.  However, with no other states following this approach, the FCPA’s 
prohibition on transnational bribery was a unilateral action with global effects that increased the costs for U.S. 
companies to bribe foreign officials in international markets.
27
  Therefore, the U.S. business community and scholars 
criticized the FCPA for its serious side effects on U.S. business abroad.
28
  Consequently, before the FCPA was 
opened up to other states in the 1990s, any academic justification or criticism of the FCPA cannot avoid explaining 
this paradox.  
 
A.  A HISTORICAL REVIEW:  THE U.S.’S UNILATERAL ILLEGALIZATION OF TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY 
The climate change regarding transnational bribery in the U.S. took place even earlier than its official 
criminalization by the FCPA.  A historical review of the pre-FCPA environment reveals that transnational bribery in 
the U.S. went through a phase of being legal before 1950,
29
 to being uncertain by the early 1970s,
30
 and finally being 
illegal in 1977.
31
  Two events that marked the gradual attitude change toward transnational bribery were the U.S.’s 
abolition of tax deductions of transnational bribery in 1958
32
 and the criminalization of transnational bribery by the 
FCPA in 1977.33  
 
1.  THE ABOLITION OF TAX DEDUCTION PROVISIONS  
Transnational bribery in the U.S., as in many other industrial states, was formerly tax deductible as a business 
expense.
34
  The tax deduction policy, as an active action of regulatory states, was an express declaration of 
transnational bribery’s legality.  The U.S. Internal Revenue Code of 1939 allowed deductions for transnational bribery 
in Section 23(a)(1) by stating that deductions would be allowed for   
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
25 See Ellen Gutterman, Easier Done Than Said: Transnational Bribery, Norm Resonance, and the Origins of the US 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2013 FOREIGN POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 4 (2012). 
26 See PIETH, supra note 9, at 6–8. 
27 See id. at 7–8. 
28 See Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 255 (1997).  
29 See generally Darrough, supra note 24, at 255, 257 (explaining that the FCPA was the first concrete prohibition on 
international bribery in the U.S.). 
30 See id. at 257.  
31 See id. at 257–58. 
32 Christopher Alan Lewis, Penalizing Bribery of Foreign Officials through the Tax Laws: A Case for Repealing Section 
162(c), 11 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 73, 73 (1977–1978).  
33 See Darrough, supra note 24, at 257–58. 
34 See Text: “Transnational Bribery” a Chapter from the U.S. National Export Strategy Report, AM. INST. IN TAIWAN 
(Nov. 14, 1996), http://www.ait.org.tw/en/officialtext-bg9640.html. 
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[a]ll the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on 
any trade or business, including . . . rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition 
to the continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property to which the 
taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity.
35 
 
 
The U.S. invalidated this tax deduction provision in 1958, which turned out to be decades earlier than other 
industrialized states.
36
  The Technical Amendments Act of 1958, which amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 
defined bribes to foreign officials as “improper payments” and stated that:  
[n]o deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any expenses paid or incurred if the 
payment thereof is made, directly or indirectly, to an official or employee of a foreign country, and 
if the making of the payment would be unlawful under the laws of the United States if such laws 
were applicable to such payment and to such official or employee.
37
 
 
The abolishment of tax deductibility signaled that transnational bribery was no longer an officially supported business 
activity in the U.S.  However, the Act described transnational bribery as “improper” instead of “illegal.”38  The new 
provision was not retroactive in terms of the effective date. 
 
The wording of the Act implied some leniency towards 
transnational bribery.
39
 
 
2.  THE FCPA ENACTMENT AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY 
The Watergate scandal and subsequent U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure programs 
finally initiated a public debate on the legal status of transnational bribery.
40
  In the early 1970s, an investigation over 
questionable funds given to President Nixon’s presidential campaign led to the revelation of a series of false 
accounting methods for concealing transnational bribery.
41
  Astonished by the false accounting issues, in 1975 and 
1976 the SEC started disclosure programs that required publically listed companies to disclose questionable payments 
made to both domestic and foreign officials.
42
  This program revealed that the frequency and actual amount of 
unreported questionable payments were staggering.43  From the perspective of the SEC, the pervasion of transnational 
bribery among listed companies not only signaled the dishonesty in corporate behavior, but also brought about a 
                                                             
35 I.R.C. § 23(a)(1) (1939).  This provision was kept by the 1954 version in Section 162(a)(3).  See I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) 
(1954).  
36 See The Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 1, 72 Stat. 1606, 1606 (1958).  
37 See id. § 5(b). 
38 Id. 
39 See id. 
40 See Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 938 (2012). 
41 See id. at 932–34. 
42 See id. at 933–35. 
43 See Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 129, 132 (2010). 
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question of their real competitiveness in the foreign marketplace.
44
  At that time, prohibiting false accounting of listed 
companies to conceal transnational bribery was already an inevitable instrument to rebuild and maintain shareholders’ 
faith in both the U.S. business system and the reputation of the U.S. business community.
45
  
However, the real controversy was the disposal of the legal status of what false accounting methods concealed, 
which were bribes to foreign officials.  Seeing as the Watergate scandal and subsequent SEC investigations had 
already brought the issue into public view, it was impossible for the government to retain an ambivalent attitude 
toward the legal status of transnational bribery.
46
  The U.S. government had to make its position known.  
At the beginning of President Ford’s Administration, he and his staff were only concerned with the dishonesty 
of false accounting, which hurt shareholders’ interest and eroded public confidence in the U.S.’s corporate 
governance.
47
  They drew fewer implications from the disclosure programs regarding the subject matter concealed 
by false accountings.  For the purpose of protecting shareholders and the general public’s right to be informed, the 
SEC and the Ford Administration intended only to ban concealing transnational bribery.
48
  It should be noted that the 
Ford Administration did not overlook the issue of transnational bribery, but instead, consciously laid aside the issue 
of transnational bribery out of trade considerations.
49
  For this argument, a 1976 SEC provided the following 
implications:  
The Commission believes that the question whether there should be a general statutory prohibition 
against the making of certain kinds of foreign payments presents a broad issue of national policy 
with important implications for international trade and commerce, the appropriateness of 
application of United States law to transactions by United States citizens in foreign countries, and 
the possible impact of such legislation upon the foreign relations of the United States.
50
 
 
 
However, Congress advocated a full prohibition of corruption, both domestic and abroad, instead of merely 
prohibiting false accounting.
51
  The reason given, like Theodore Sorenson stated in a 1976 House hearing was: 
The Ford [a]dministration . . . prefers to rely solely upon the offending corporation notifying the 
                                                             
44  Harris, supra note 6, at 19–22. 
45  Id. at 15–16. 
46 See generally Macleans A. Geo-JaJa & Garth L. Mangum, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s Consequences for 
U.S. Trade:  The Nigerian Example, 24 J. BUS. ETHICS 245 (2000) (examining the history and current legal status of transnational 
bribery). 
47 See id. at 246. 
48 Id. 
49  See Elitza Katzarova, National Origin of the Global Anti-Corruption Business 5 (Mar. 16, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/5/0/0/4/8/pages500486/p500486-
5.php. 
50 Seymour J. Rubin, United States: Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal 
Corporate Payments and Practices, 15 I.L.M. 618, 627 (1976). 
51 See Gutterman, supra note 25, at 13. 
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Department of Commerce of its misdeed . . . .  What a pitifully pallid response to a major moral 
crisis.  Have we learned nothing from the attempted [coverup] of Watergate? . . .  How could this 
country continue to preach abroad the virtues of the free competitive market system and continue 
to call for economic justice and political integrity, how could we hope to avoid unreasonable 
restrictions and attacks on American corporations abroad, if we are unwilling to specially and 
directly prohibit and penalize this wasteful, corrosive, shabby practice?
52
  
 
As a result, Congress rejected the draft legislation proposed by the Ford Administration in 1976, which did not 
prohibit transnational bribery.
53
  
Negotiation surrounding transnational bribery fell into a deadlock until 1977, when President Carter took office 
and “pushed for legislation [criminalizing] the bribery of foreign public officials.”54  Soon after, Congress suggested 
legislation that not only had stringent accounting requirements, but also declared transnational bribery unlawful.
55  
The legislation passed by a unanimous vote,
56
 and is now well renowned as the FCPA.  The FCPA prohibits acts of 
both public issuers and privately owned domestic concerns that are   
corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of 
any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value 
to . . . any foreign official[,] . . . foreign political party[,] or . . . any candidate for foreign 
political office for purposes of . . . obtaining or retaining business.57  
 
The enactment of the FCPA was a revolutionary event in the history of the global anti-corruption campaign.  It 
“marked the first important step” to holding transnational bribery as a sanctionable crime. 58   The FCPA also 
unprecedentedly institutionalized supply-side control of corruption independent of demand-side control of 
corruption of host countries.
59
  Besides, by ceasing U.S. domestic concerns from corrupt behaviors both inside and 
outside U.S. territories, the FCPA routinized extraterritorial application of criminal laws, which once was an 
exceptional principle in conventional international law.
60
  
When signing the FCPA into law, President Carter summarized the immorality and economical inefficiency of 
corporate bribery.
61
  He stated that,  
                                                             
52 Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. and Fin. of the H. Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 2 (1976) (statement of Theodore Sorensen).  
53 See Koehler, supra note 40, at 992–94. 
54 PIETH, supra note 9, at 7. 
55 See id. 
56 Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future?, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 229, 234 (2009). 
57 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (2013).  
58 PIETH, supra note 9, at 6. 
59 Id. at 19–21. 
60 Id. at 20–22. 
61 See Presidential Statement on Signing the Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure Bill, 2 PUB. PAPERS 
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during my campaign for the Presidency, I repeatedly stressed the need for tough legislation to prohibit 
corporate bribery.  S. 305 provides that necessary sanction.  I share Congress[’] belief that bribery is 
ethically repugnant and competitively unnecessary.  Corrupt practices between corporations and public 
officials undermine the integrity and stability of governments and harm our relations with other 
countries.  Recent revelations of widespread overseas bribery have eroded public confidence in our 
basic institutions.
62
  
However, President Carter also showed his worries about the potential side effect of unilaterally enforcing the FCPA 
on U.S. overseas businesses, which was the major consideration that accounted for the Ford Administration’s 
resistance to outlawing transnational bribery.
63
  Carter encouraged other nations to make progress on negotiations for 
a multilateral anti-corruption treaty, stating that the effort to combat corporate bribery overseas “can only be fully 
successful . . . if other countries and business itself take comparable action.”64  
 
3.  A CONSEQUENT QUESTION: THE SIDE EFFECT OF THE FCPA ON U.S. OVERSEAS BUSINESS 
As noted above, the FCPA enactment was a strategy based on U.S. decision makers’ full awareness of the 
immorality of transnational bribery and the side effects of such a unilateral prohibition.  The immorality of 
transnational bribery was almost undisputable; however, there was also widespread consensus among U.S. officials 
that a unilateral prohibition of transnational bribery would impose additional constraints on U.S. corporations and 
would put them at a disadvantage in the overseas marketplace.
65
  The core controversy between the Ford 
Administration and Congress (or the Carter Administration) was not whether side effects of unilaterally prohibiting 
transnational bribery existed, but whether such potential side effects justified a continuous laissez-faire attitude of 
regulators.
66
  
Although the enactment of the FCPA officially answered this question in the negative, concern about FCPA side 
effects did not stop.  The U.S. government was pressed to work out remedial measures to reduce the predictable side 
effects of the FCPA.
67
  Therefore, the U.S. government never stopped trying to multilateralize the FCPA and 
establish an anti-bribery collaboration in the years surrounding the enactment of the FCPA.
68
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
2157 (Dec. 20, 1977). 
62 Id. 
63 See id. 
64 Id.  
65 See Gutterman, supra note 25, at 2. 
66 See id. at 3.  
67 See INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF INT’L BRIBERY AND FAIR 
COMPETITION (2004). 
68 Id. at 4. 
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4.  U.S. EFFORTS AND FAILURES TO MULTILATERALIZE THE FCPA 
a.  U.S. Efforts 
While promulgating the FCPA to address the issue of transnational bribery, the U.S. also engaged in multiple 
approaches to multilateralize the FCPA to cope with the side effects generated by its unilateral enforcement.
69
  On 
the one hand, the U.S. government tried to popularize the anti-bribery initiative through trade negotiations with other 
countries.
70
  Senate Resolution 265, promulgated on November 12, 1975,
71
 noted that the U.S. should immediately 
negotiate with other governments to develop proper norms to eliminate the issue of transnational bribery on an 
international scale:  
Directed mainly at the effect of such payments on international trade, that Resolution resolved that 
the appropriate governmental officials initiate at once negotiations within the framework of the 
current multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva, in other negotiations of trade agreements 
pursuant to the Trade Act of 1974 and in other appropriate international forums with the intent of 
developing an appropriate code of conduct and specific trading obligations among governments, 
together with suitable procedures for the settlement of disputes, which would result in elimination 
of such practices on an international, multi-national basis, including suitable sanctions to cope 
with problems posed by non-participating nations .
72
 
 
On the other hand, the U.S. also endeavored to draw support from intergovernmental organizations to foster 
multilateral support its anti-bribery initiative.
73
  As transnational bribery went against the basic pursuits of these 
international organizations, they soon endorsed the anti-bribery initiative of the U.S.  
On July 10, 1975, the Organization of American States (OAS) issued the Permanent Council Resolution on the 
Behavior of Transnational Enterprises (CP/RES. 154 (167/75)).
74
  The Resolution “condemn[ed] in the most 
emphatic terms any act of bribery, illegal payment, or offer of payment by any transnational enterprise; any demand 
for or acceptance of improper payments by any public or private person, as well as any act contrary to ethics and 
legal procedures,” and “urge[d] the governments of the member states, insofar as necessary, to clarify their national 
                                                             
69 See David R. Slade, Comment, Foreign Corrupt Payments: Enforcing A Multilateral Agreement, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
117, 127 (1981). 
70 Id. 
71 S. Res. 265, 94th Cong. (as passed by Senate, Nov. 12, 1975). 
72 Rubin, supra note 50, at 618.  
73 See generally Joongi Kim & Jong Bum Kim, Cultural Differences in the Crusade Against International Bribery: 
Rice-Cake Expenses in Korea and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 549, 550-57 (1997) (discussing 
multilateral efforts made by various intergovernmental organizations to curb international bribery). 
74  Org. of Am. States, Organization of American States: Permanent Council Resolution on the Behavior of 
Transnational Enterprises, 14 I.L.M. 1326, 1326–28 (1975). 
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laws with regard to the aforementioned improper or illegal acts.”  75  On December 15, 1975, the General Assembly 
of the United Nations (U.N.) issued Resolution 3514(XXX) “condemning all corrupt practices, including bribery, in 
international commercial transactions.”76  Resolution 3514(XXX) also emphasized that any country was entitled to 
legislate anti-bribery laws and take action against corruption.
77
  In 1976, the OECD issued the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (1976 Guidelines),
78
 which absorbed provisions against bribery of foreign officials in 
international trade by stating that enterprises should “not render—and they should not be solicited or expected to 
render—any bribe or other improper benefit, direct or indirect, to any public servant or holder of public office.”79  In 
1977, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) provided a positive response to the FCPA by issuing the Rules 
of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery (ICC Rules).
80
  It called for cooperation by governments, 
intergovernmental organizations, and the business community to combat extortion and bribery in international 
business transactions.
81
  
 
b.  U.S. Failures and Possible Reasons 
U.S. efforts to multilateralize the FCPA achieved little success in the 1970s and the 1980s.
82
  The lateral or 
multilateral anti-bribery norms written into trade treaties were basically unenforceable moral standards.
83
  Although 
the U.N. considered the U.S. initiative as “generally appreciated and welcome by many delegations,”84 its attempts 
at multilateralism failed because “it was either perceived as an act of expansive moralism or [the other countries] 
suspected a hidden [hegemonial] trade-agenda.”85  
It is self-evident that Europeans considered economics when refusing the U.S. proposal to outlaw transnational 
bribery.  While there were a series of domestic factors in the U.S. that fostered the FCPA enactment, other 
                                                             
75 Id. 
76 G.A. Res 51/191, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/191 (Dec. 16, 1996). 
77 Rubin, supra note 50, at 618.  
78 Orginisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, A Chronology of Main Events in 1976, 1979 EUR. Y.B. 
165, 193.  
79 Id. 
80  INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMBATING EXTORTION AND BRIBERY: ICC RULES OF CONDUCT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (2005), available at http://www.giaccentre.org/documents/ICCRulesofConduct.2005.pdf. 
81 See id. at 10–13. 
82 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight against 
Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 141, 162 (2002). 
83 See PIETH, supra note 9, at 9. 
84 Rubin, supra note 50, at 620. 
85 Mark Pieth, International Efforts to Combat Corruption, INT’L ANTI-CORRUPTION CONF., 
http://9iacc.org/papers/day1/ws6/d1ws6_mpieth.html. 
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industrialized states did not share the same social contexts.
86
  Therefore, there were no incentives to change an 
unproblematic status quo.
87
  Furthermore, as noted previously, the increase or decrease of overseas business was a 
critical consideration for both the U.S. and other industrialized states.
88
  The overseas contracts secured by paying 
bribes were still a dominant component of national welfare.
89
  When the U.S., which was superior to many other 
states in terms of competitiveness, self-disarmed by adopting the FCPA, there were no reasons for other states to 
join.
90
  They simply preferred to continue to enjoy the competitive advantages brought by the FCPA’s enactment.91  
Equally salient hindering factors were ideological obstacles.
92
  Although political corruption was criminalized 
early in the collective history of humankind, a popular, if not dominant, view on corporate bribery at that time was 
that it was conditionally necessary.
93
  Due to its extraterritorial nature, transnational bribery was even more remote 
from the concerns of national prosecutors than domestic corporate bribery.
94
  Besides, the concepts of globalization 
and global welfare, which were critical for understanding the evils of transnational bribery, remained unpopular.
95
  
In contrast, European officials questioned the legitimacy of the extraterritorial enforcement of the FCPA and 
dismissed it as a kind of imperialism that disturbed the business atmosphere of host states.
96  
The assertion about 
imperialism or culture invasion concerned U.S. officials as well.
97
  On June 5, 1975, in the hearings before the 
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, State Department Deputy Legal Advisor Mark Feldman 
stated the following about the enforcement of the FCPA: 
[E]nforcement of such legislation . . . would involve surveillance of the activities of foreign 
officials as well as U.S. businessmen and would be widely resented abroad.  Extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law—which is what such legislation would entail—has often been viewed by 
other governments as a sign of U.S. arrogance or even as interference in their internal affairs.  U.S. 
penal laws are normally based on territorial jurisdiction and, with rare exceptions, we believe that 
is sound policy.
98
  
                                                             
86  See KENNETH W. ABBOTT & DUNCAN SNIDAL, FILLING IN THE FOLK THEOREM: THE ROLE OF GRADUALISM AND 
LEGALIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO COMBAT CORRUPTION 23 (2002), available at 
http://www.international.ucla.edu/media/files/Duncan_Snidal.pdf. 
87 See Davis, Self-Interest, supra note 16, at 317. 
88 See Presidential Statement on Signing the Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure Bill, supra note 61. 
89 See Salbu, supra note 28, at 262. 
90 See Patrick Glynn, Stephen J. Kobrin & Moisés Naím, The Globalization of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 7, 22 (Kimberly Ann Elliot ed., 1997). 
91 See id. 
92 See Michael D. Breidenbach, Towards a Global Ethic: An Analysis of and Proposal for Antibribery Legislation and 
Practices, 1 NW. INTERDISC. L. REV. 163, 182 (2008). 
93 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 82, at 158–160.   
94 See id. at 166–167. 
95 See generally S.A.B. Page, The Revival of Protectionism and its Consequences for Europe, 20 J. COMMON MKT. 
STUD. 17 (1981) (discussing Europe's shift away from free trade). 
96 See Salbu, supra note 28, at 261. 
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These disputes between the U.S. and European governments suggested that, in the historical context of the 
1970s, following the U.S.’s lead meant there would be large scale reform of existing legal frameworks for purposes 
that were not guaranteed to be beneficial.  European resistance to a U.S. led policy initiative was understandable, 
and without European support, the enactment of the FCPA would remain a unilateral policy of the U.S. government.  
 
B.  THE STANDARD RATIONAL CHOICE ACCOUNT OF THE FCPA AND ITS LIMITS 
Though there was consensus within the American public regarding the immorality of transnational bribery, 
Americans were split on the wisdom of the FCPA’s unilateral nature.  Between the 1970s and the early 2000s, 
scholars tended to focus on the motives, rather than the wisdom, of the FCPA’s implementation.99  In order to 
categorize the U.S. government’s motivation for passing the FCPA, previous research primarily emphasized rational 
choice theory before shifting to a binary framework focusing on morality and self-interest.
100
  
Some scholars highlighted the plausible altruism of unilateral enforcement of the FCPA—that the FCPA seemed 
to reflect moral values of the U.S. at the cost of overseas business—and thus were convinced that the FCPA was a 
product of the U.S.’s morals.101  Starting from the same ideological stance, scholars held different opinions as to the 
wisdom of the FCPA.  One group of scholars believed that the immorality of transnational bribery was sufficient to 
explain the wisdom of the FCPA, while dissenters argued that the immorality of transnational bribery was insufficient 
to justify unilateral implementation, condemning the FCPA as an outcome of pan-moralism.
102
   
Other scholars argued that unilateral implementation of the FCPA was a wise strategy.
103
  As history shows, U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Pol’y of the Comm. on Int’l Relations, 94th Cong. 24 (1975) (statement of Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser, Dep’t of 
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Practices Act, 56 ACCT. REV. 751, 751–756 (1981). 
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J. BUS. ETHICS 789, 789–91 (1988). 
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policymakers had a clear understanding of the potentially adverse consequences of unilaterally enforcing the FCPA; 
therefore, they believed that the FCPA was likely in the U.S.’s interest.104  The FCPA was not a move of altruism or 
self-interest, but rather a move of rationality and wisdom.  In other words, the FCPA was the best decision in terms of 
the U.S. government’s national interests.  
In general, the arguments based on rational choice theory included a fundamental assumption in international 
relations—the rationality of state actors. 105   These rational choice scholars were not concerned whether the 
immorality of transnational bribery sufficiently justified the FCPA.  Instead, they sought to reconcile the necessity of 
eliminating immoral transnational bribery with the harmful consequences of unilaterally enforcing the FCPA.
106
  
Some of them achieved this by explaining the FCPA as a trade-off between conflicting national interests.
107
  Under 
this interpretation, the FCPA was created to achieve the long-term benefits of reduced transnational bribery at the 
expense of short-term U.S. overseas business.
108
  Specifically, some argued that although transnational bribery 
accelerated short-term overseas business, a laissez-faire policy may lead U.S. companies to become too dependent on 
paying bribes to the point that they become less competitive.
109
  Therefore, the U.S. sought to prohibit transnational 
bribery in order to maintain the long-term competitiveness of U.S. companies.
110
  Some have also argued that the U.S. 
only engaged in such an unprecedented action for the purpose of rebuilding the reputation of the business 
community.111  Others argue that the FCPA was enacted to limit the added costs of transnational bribery, or to limit 
interference with the U.S. government’s foreign policy.  Despite the variations between arguments, these scholars 
essentially contended that the U.S. enacted the FCPA out of a holistic consideration of national interests.  Unilateral 
enforcement of the FCPA might have a negative impact on short-term U.S. business interests, but it would benefit the 
overall U.S. economy in the end.  
Compared with the first school of thought, which concerned the immorality of transnational bribery and the 
justification of unilateral FCPA enforcement, the second set of arguments was more instructive.  They rationalized the 
                                                             
104 See generally Abbott & Snidal, supra note 86, at 163 (noting both domestic and international benefits).  
105 Robert O. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 158, 
164–65 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1989). 
106 See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 100, at 792–94. 
107 See id. at 794. 
108 See sources cited supra note 101. 
109 Brian K. Gose, FOREIGN CORRUPT BRIBERY ACT: LONG-TERM BENEFITS SHOULD OUTWEIGH SHORT-TERM BURDENS 
29 (November 28, 2011) (Senior Thesis, Claremont McKenna College).   
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Foreign Corruption out of the United States, 32 DEF. INST. OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE MGMT. J. OF INT’L SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
MGMT. 94, 94–95 (2010). 
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FCPA and highlighted the shortsightedness of the idea that international operations of U.S. businesses could only 
prosper through bribery.  Utilizing rational choice theory gives greater insight by better accounting for the complexity 
of U.S. national interests.  
However, this interpretative approach is too speculative to discover and explain new facts in evolutionary 
contexts.  Academic analysis is so path dependent that we rely on established knowledge to discover and understand 
new facts.  Scholars need a progressive, interpretative approach that applies to the subject matter in a given moment 
and enables continuous explanation across time and space.  With the rise of a series of international anti-bribery 
agreements in the 1990s,
112
 scholars needed to predict the performance of these agreements and probe potential 
enforcement problems.  Explaining the FCPA as a consequence of trading off conflicting interests rationalized the 
FCPA at the cost of accuracy.  For interpretative purposes, it oversimplified the complexity of the decision making 
procedures to a linear calculation of conflicting interests.  However, this logic is too ambiguous to identify real 
world interests and draw deterministic conclusions.
113
  In addition, this approach also overlooked the variation in the 
value of interests in the eyes of different domestic groups and obscured the dynamic of repeated negotiations, 
conflicts, and compromises between these groups.  Therefore, when this interpretative approach managed to 
convince people of the rationality of the FCPA, it told an inaccurate story.  
 
C.  THE FCPA AS AN OUTCOME OF COORDINATING MULTIPLE DOMESTIC DEMANDS WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF 
DEMOCRATIC VALUES 
Other than a rational choice account that assumes the optimizing manner of the U.S. and speculates as to its 
motives, an exploration of how the U.S. legislature considered and acted in the historical context would be more 
relevant to understand why the U.S. endogenously created the FCPA.  For this purpose, we should not only 
emphasize the variety of interest demands on U.S. values (like economic and reputational interests), but also 
highlight, instead of avoid, the fact that different domestic political forces had their own preferences, albeit with 
roughly equal discursive powers in post-Watergate negotiations regarding legislative remedies.  In a democratic 
society where citizenry and governmental departments have their own channels to express and realize their interest 
demands, especially those with a complex structure of stakeholders in the society, legislative activity is less likely to 
be a process of allocating certain values to different interest demands, and more likely to sacrifice inferior values for 
                                                             
112 OECD, International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations, at 140 (2008).  
113 Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 599 
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superior ones.  It is characterized more by a legislative effort to coordinate these divergent demands through 
negotiations rather than to achieve a high degree of consensus among different stakeholders.
114
  Conflicts take place, 
but under many situations, the demands of various stakeholders are not completely irreconcilable and can be 
coordinated on a common ground.  Therefore, the final decision does not often reflect any superior interest demand; 
rather, it is nearly always reached through negotiations, confrontations, and concessions among various stakeholders.  
During the process, rational stakeholders constantly adjust their expectations to realize their self-interest in the 
largest practical extent possible.
115
  
How were the divergent demands of different stakeholders in the post-Watergate years reconciled by the FCPA?  
As the Watergate scandal and SEC disclosure programs exposed the false accounting that concealed transnational 
bribery to the general public, all stakeholders of this issue would have a responsive attitude toward it.
116
  
Stakeholder’s interest demands were quite different.  For example, the SEC, which was committed to improving 
corporate governance and spoke on behalf of public shareholders, was concerned with the false accounting that 
violated public investors’ right to know, which in turn affected the public confidence in the U.S. business system.117  
Accordingly, it only demanded effective “disclosure of material foreign corporate payments to investors.”118  The 
Defense Department however was concerned that U.S. companies’ participation in corrupt behaviors in foreign 
military sales would undermine the U.S.’s defense interest, and thus required legislative remedies to “keep [the] 
private sector[s] from interfering with U.S. foreign policy and national security interests.”119  The State Department 
spoke on behalf of holistic national interests and was more ambivalent than others.  On the one hand, it was more 
concerned about the negative consequence of unilaterally criminalizing transnational bribery than other 
governmental departments;
120
 on the other hand, officials in Congress were also worried that if the U.S. had a 
laissez-faire attitude, a revelation of transnational bribery would embarrass friendly governments and negatively 
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impact economic and political relations with those states.
121
  For other governmental agencies like the Department of 
Revenue, although there were no solid historical records, it had an inner demand for honest accounting as well.  
Although these examples oversimplify the variety of stakeholders and their concerns, they have broadly 
illustrated the divergence of stakeholders and their demands.  Due to this divergence, between June 1975 and 
September 1977 there were repeated exchanges of views among these governmental departments and around twenty 
bills were introduced to address the problem.
122
  As the New York City Bar Association commented, “[n]o single 
issue of corporate behavior has engendered in recent times as much discussion in the United States—both in the 
private and public arenas— . . . as payments made abroad by corporations.”123  
In theory, in order to adopt appropriate strategies to coordinate these divergent domestic demands, it is critical 
to identify the “interoperability” of them.  In his theory on the coordination game, Professor Ahdieh describes the 
term interoperability as the compatibility and reconcilability of different things.
124
  In this case, it means the 
common core of all these demands.  Essentially, the plausibly divergent demands converged on the need to recover 
the supervisory control of the U.S. government and general public over the corporate behaviors in overseas areas.
125
  
To that effect, a necessary and sufficient legislative remedy was to stringently prohibit false accounting.  Once false 
accounting was prohibited, the U.S. government and its citizens would be better equipped to monitor corporate 
behaviors and immediately respond to any negative effects.  Therefore, in 1976 the Ford Administration suggested a 
bill prohibiting false accounting, but laid aside the highly controversial issue of transnational bribery.
126
  
Unfortunately, that was the end of the coordination game in regard to the U.S.’s legislative activity at the time; 
however, it was not the end of the story.  In addition to coordinating divergent domestic demands of stakeholders at 
an efficient equilibrium, an equally if not more fundamental function of law is to reflect and safeguard commonly 
held social values by way of defining good behaviors and orienting citizens toward them.
127
  This normative 
function identifies the law’s stringent commitment to moral correctness.  Well-established moral values act as a 
baseline that any code of law cannot actively or inferably go against. 
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Although the immorality of transnational bribery had not amounted to public opinion around the world, the U.S. 
already declared transnational bribery as immoral as early as it abolished tax deductions for it.
128
  Besides, during 
the two-year long discussions on specific bills to deal with transnational bribery, immorality became an explicit 
talking point for both officials and citizens alike.  Consequently, no matter how the discussion among governmental 
agencies finally defined the relevance of outlawing transnational bribery in regard to U.S. national interests, the 
immorality of transnational bribery became an increasingly accepted fact.
129
  This fact ensured that new laws 
coming into place could not expressly or impliedly send signals of encouragement or tolerance of transnational 
bribery.  
What makes the continuation of a laissez-faire attitude in the U.S. a signal of encouragement or toleration of 
transnational bribery in the new context?  People may argue that since the U.S. asserted the immorality of 
transnational bribery in the 1950s, but did not take further action against it for two decades, it did not have to 
expressly outlaw it during the 1970s either.  However, the situation changed with the combination of the Watergate 
scandal and the SEC disclosure programs.  Due to the close ties between the issues of transnational bribery and the 
necessity to prohibit false accounting, there would no longer be any uncertainty as to the legal status of transnational 
bribery.
130
  Either action or inaction of the U.S. government would act as an official declaration regarding the legal 
status of transnational bribery.  Congress was destined to reject the law drafted by the Ford Administration, as it 
merely prohibited false accounting.
131
  
It is noteworthy that emphasizing the normative function and moral relevance of the law is not synonymous 
with arguing that one branch of the standard rational choice analysis, in which the FCPA was founded on, was based 
on U.S. moralism.  Ending false accounting and transnational bribery was not originally intended by many 
governmental agencies participating in the discussion, but became an unavoidable choice in the end.132  Here, a 
paradox arose:  Although prohibiting transnational bribery was not necessarily good—it was predictably bad for 
overseas business—but not forbidding it was even more prohibitive.133  During this process, the U.S. government 
did not autonomously sacrifice its overseas business interests due to a moral high ground or other superior national 
                                                             
128 See The Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 1, 72 Stat. 1606, 1606 (1958).  
129 See Koehler, supra note 40, at 943. 
130 Id at 943. 
131 See id. at 988–90. 
132 See id. at 961–71. 
133 See Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions 
Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351, 392–95 (2010). 
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interests.  Its final strategies were limited within the boundaries of the established value system of its society.  
Summarily, there were three key phases that lead to the consequent creation of the FCPA:  First, the Watergate 
scandal and SEC disclosure programs brought about divergent domestic demands of a variety of stakeholders and 
forced the need of legislative remedies to coordinate these demands.
134
  Second, the lawmaking mechanism of 
society determined that the initial versions of the proposed laws would result in repeated negotiations, 
confrontations, and concessions among the different political forces and eventually coordinate divergent demands 
once a common ground had been found.
135
  Lastly, the final version of the law would be ultimately shaped within the 
existing value system of the society.
136
  
More profoundly, the FCPA (a consequence of the Watergate scandal and the change from the Ford 
Administration to the Carter Administration) was an inevitable product of the economic context of the U.S. during 
that time.
137
  The development of modern corporate systems required a strong corporate governance structure and 
exposed corporate behavior to public scrutiny.  Once this new economic pursuit was confirmed by the legal system, 
the inherent demand for transparency in corporate governance would objectively squeeze the space for transnational 
bribery.  For example, once false accounting was prohibited, the act of bribing U.S. corporations could be exposed.  
Foreign states and officials as well as the U.S. government and American corporations would be embarrassed, which 
would lead to more economic, moral, and diplomatic problems.
138
  Therefore, the issue of transnational bribery was 
marginalized by a modern society with stable values and new economic pursuits.  However, in the U.S. the FCPA 
was waiting for its time to make an appearance.  This would then become the most fundamental source for 
endogenously creating the FCPA. 
 
III.  THE OECD CONVENTION AS A “U.S. INDUCED” INSTITUTION 
This portion analyzes the historical context of the FCPA after its creation in 1977 in order to better understand 
the central dynamic that lead to the establishment of the Convention in 1997.  After the U.S. enacted the FCPA, but 
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failed to multilateralize it, the side effects of the FCPA became a salient concern.
139
  In the late 1980s, the U.S. 
government began a new round of diplomatic efforts to multilateralize the FCPA, achieving rapid progress in the 
early 1990s; this ultimately culminated in the passing of the Convention in 1997.
140
  Different from the enactment of 
the FCPA, the formation of the Convention was closely associated with the U.S.’s diplomatic strategies.141  Just as 
addressing the tension between the necessity to combat corrupt corporate behavior and its predictable side effects is 
central to understanding the FCPA’s creation, identifying the U.S.’s role in the Convention is central to 
understanding the formation of the OECD anti-bribery collaboration.  
 
A.  A HISTORICAL REVIEW:  THE ROLE OF THE U.S. IN THE CREATION OF THE CONVENTION 
1.  U.S. MOTIVES TO ESTABLISH A CONVENTION 
Since the 1980s, loud voices had criticized the FCPA’s side effects on the U.S. economy.  A popular view of the 
time was that the FCPA decreased U.S. business in corrupt countries.
142
  President Clinton suggested in 1998, at the 
formation of the Convention, that the unilateral enforcement of the FCPA had “resulted in losses of international 
contracts estimated at $ 30 billion per year.”143  In contrast to the sentiments President Clinton shared, there were 
also proponents of the act contending that the FCPA did not actually cause a reduction in the U.S. economy.144  
However, the complaints regarding detrimental impacts on U.S. business interests greatly concerned the U.S. 
government.   
Previously, there were discussions concerning whether the FCPA should be repealed.  Essentially, two 
approaches emerged to reduce the side effects of the FCPA on overseas business transaction:  to repeal the FCPA or 
to popularize it.145  Given the failure to achieve multilateral cooperation in the 1970s, loud domestic voices called 
                                                             
139 See Presidential Statement, supra note 61. 
140 Spahn, supra note 15, at 5–6.  
141 Court E. Golumbic & Jonathan P. Adams, The “Dominant Influence” Test: The FCPA’s “Instrumentality” and 
“Foreign Official” Requirements and the Investment Activity of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L 1, 12 (2011).  
142 Roberto Ramos, Banning US Foreign Bribery: Do US Firms Win? 24–26 (Ctr. For Monetary and Fin. Studies, 
Working Paper, 2012); James R. Hines, Jr., Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business After 1977 1–2 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5266, 1995).   
143 Presidential Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 34 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 2290 (Nov. 10, 1998). 
144 Barry Richman, Can We Prevent Questionable Foreign Payments?, 22 BUS. HORIZONS 14, 14–19 (1979).  See J. 
DAVID RICHARDSON, SIZING UP U.S. EXPORT DISINCENTIVES 131 (2nd ed.1993); John L. Graham, The Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: A New Perspective, 15 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 107, 107 (1996). 
145 See Michael Copeland & Robert F. Scott, Efforts to Combat Transnational Bribery: Problems with and Alternatives 
to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 22 J. SECURITY ADMIN. 47, 50–51. 
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for abolishing the FCPA.
146
  However, it was unrealistic for the U.S. to repeal the FCPA for several reasons.   
First, the endogenous creation of the FCPA suggested that the U.S.’s real expectation was to popularize, rather 
than repeal, the FCPA.  Fully aware of the FCPA’s side effects prior to its enactment, U.S. policymakers were 
unlikely to repeal it for the same reason.  Second, the U.S. could not threaten to repeal the FCPA for strategic 
purposes.  In an international circumstance where other states were not convinced of their benefits in combating 
transnational bribery, neither the enactment nor the abolishment of the FCPA would alter their strategic choices.
147
  
Third, repealing the FCPA would be troublesome for the U.S. because of the “stick[iness]” of anti-corruption 
laws.
148
  Institutional stickiness means the ability or inability of institutional change to take hold where it is 
transplanted.
 149
  At that time, the FCPA had been enforced for years and had been applied to the investigation of 
more than a dozen bribery cases.
150
  Repealing the FCPA would make it difficult to deal with these established 
decisions.  
Since a repeal was infeasible, the U.S. alternatively sought to soften the side effects with two options:
151
  First, 
the U.S. government could withhold efforts during FCPA enforcement.  As FCPA enforcement was at the discretion 
of the SEC and the Department of Justice (DOJ), they could control the level of enforcement and therefore guide its 
negative economic consequences to fall within an acceptable range.
152
  Second, the U.S. could modify the FCPA and 
symbolically soften some of its harsh terms.  In 1988, Congress passed the Omnibus Foreign Trade and 
Competitiveness Act (OFTCA), which revised conviction standards of the 1977 version of the Act.
153
  While the 
1977 version prohibited payments that a payer knew, or had a reason to know, were for illegal purposes, the 1988 
version of the OFTCA only prohibited payments where the payer had actual knowledge.
154
  Furthermore, two 
                                                             
146  Copeland suggested that “if no treaty comes into force, we will no longer put our business community at a 
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affirmative defenses were added to the 1988 version that relieved defendants of liability.
155
  
Although expedient, softening the FCPA’s side effects by withholding efforts had limited success.  Popularizing 
the FCPA norms remained the best approach for the U.S. to get out of this dilemma.  For this reason, the 1988 
Amendment to the FCPA explicitly urged the President to negotiate with OECD member countries to adopt the 
FCPA.
156
  The central work of the U.S. then focused on implementing a new round of strategies to recruit allies.  
 
2.  U.S. STRATEGIES TO ESTABLISH A CONVENTION 
When the Clinton Administration took office in 1993, the U.S. government began to adopt aggressive foreign 
policies to multilateralize the FCPA.
157
  Scholars often categorize these U.S. strategies as either interest-based 
strategies or value-based strategies.
158
  Interest-based strategies refer to the U.S.’s use of economic leverage to press 
anti-bribery terms upon others through bilateral or multilateral trade treaties or other channels.
159
  The rationale of 
this strategy is to impose incentives and disincentives to influence the responsive strategies of other states.  Value-
based strategies refer to the U.S.’s attempts to use its discursive power in international affairs in order to make 
normative persuasion and define “right” and “wrong.”160  This distinction, which juxtaposes interest and value, is 
employed for analytic clarity.  As it is in international politics, interests and values are often interconvertible; no 
specific strategy is purely interest-based or value-based.
161
  Accordingly, the U.S. would employ several major 
strategies to combat opposition to multilateralization.    
 
a.  The Strategy of Pressing Anti-Bribery Terms by Trade Treaties 
The U.S. began to press anti-bribery terms on other states through treaties and industry associations in the 
1970s.
162
  This tool was used even more aggressively in the 1990s.  The U.S. considered other governments’ refusals 
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OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-
2014]       THE DYNAMIC OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE            47 
OECD ANTI-BRIBERY COLLABORATION 
 
to accept anti-bribery terms to be a “trade policy matter.”163 
The U.S.’s tool that sought to exchange trade treaties for anti-bribery cooperation can be understood as either a 
strategy of side payment or a strategy of “tit-for-tat.”  In treaty negotiations, when the expected treaties are likely to 
benefit some negotiators but are unhelpful or even harmful for other negotiators, the potentially benefited signatories 
can pay a price to compensate the potentially disadvantaged ones to elicit a cooperative decision.
164
  The 
compensation made by the potential winners is known as a “side payment.”165   The strategy of making side 
payments aims to draw ambivalent parties into agreement.  The tit-for-tat strategy is also a private relief measure in 
international relations, and is used to retaliate defectors toward cooperation.
166
  It means that disadvantaged 
cooperators often take a retaliatory action in the next round to offset a defecting cooperator’s unjust enrichment , and 
to protect themselves from further potential loss.
167
 
Regardless of labels, the rationale behind using this tool was that the U.S., as the strongest economic power, 
was able to use its leverage in international economic affairs to trade off preferential terms for anti -bribery terms.  
By this approach, it appeared that the U.S. intended to alter the payoffs of other states and their strategies on whether 
to accept the FCPA-style norms.
168
  This followed the basic logic of a rational choice theory.
169
  
The U.S.’s strategy to popularize anti-bribery norms through trade treaties seemed to be a feasible vehicle; 
however, it had limited effects.  Due to the multifaceted nature of transnational bribery, real opposition against it 
demands intervention by national powers, as well as cooperation by many governmental and non-governmental 
departments.  The U.S.’s economic leverage might be able to press anti-bribery terms upon economically 
interdependent states, but it was unable to bring about high-level and holistic legislative changes.  
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b.  The Strategy of “Public Diplomacy” 
An equally important U.S. strategy was using European political forces to press anti-bribery terms on European 
governments.  While Tarullo phrased this strategy as one of “public diplomacy,”170 Abbott and Snidal referred to it 
as “value tactics.”171  Several similar versions have circulated regarding how the U.S. made use of a series of 
corruption scandals in Europe in the 1990s to publicize the damaging effects of corruption on European citizens.
172
  
Essentially, the U.S. utilized the public hostility toward corruption to sway the European resistance towards 
legislating against transnational bribery.  In order for this strategy to work, two basic factors needed to be present.  
First, and regardless of the interest considerations of the decision makers, the public opinion often supported the 
right decisions instead of interest maximizing decisions.
173
  The remoteness of common people from the economic 
relevance of transnational bribery even oriented them towards the U.S. claims.  Second, European governments not 
only acted to optimize material interests in international trade, but also felt they should respond to the value demand 
of their own people.  
In the early 1990s when several European corruption scandals were revealed, European citizens began to 
demonstrate increasing hostility toward corruption.  The voice of the media gradually shifted to the U.S.’s side and 
urged their countries to adopt stringent measures to control corruption.
174
  The domestic climate, with an increasing 
hostility toward corruption, converged into a rising pressure on European governments.  Both the external pressure 
and domestic atmosphere nibbled away at the European governments’ interested-based resistance to the U.S. 
initiative.
175
  As Tarullo suggested, this strategy of “public diplomacy” worked to “shift the positions taken by 
European governments which, until that point, had been recalcitrant.”176  
 
c.  The Strategy of Normative Persuasion through International Organizations 
Apart from imposing either direct or indirect pressure on European governments, the U.S. also relied upon 
international organizations to perform normative persuasion.  This strategy had a strong flavor of “value strategy” 
through all its measures.  As mentioned above, the European states’ long-term resistance to the U.S. initiative was 
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not simply interest-based; it also included ideological obstacles, which affected their understanding of the action’s 
legitimacy.
177
  In the years surrounding the early 1990s, the immorality and inefficiency of commercial corruption 
remained an unpopular view.
178
  Furthermore, the international relevance of transnational bribery only added to such 
complications.  In view of this, and while using economic leverage, the U.S. also used its discursive power in 
international occasions to induce an attitude change toward transnational bribery.  
Although the deleterious effect of transnational bribery remained an unpopular argument in the early 1990s, the 
global, economic, and political climate at the time was well prepared for an attitude change.  A widely held view is 
that “the fall of the Soviet Union” after the Cold War provided an impetus to expanding international markets and 
democratic values.
179
  Frequent multilateral transactions made the concept of globalization increasingly popular.
180
  
In this context, international cooperation, as opposed to conflict, gradually became the dominant approach for states 
to maximize their national interests.
181
  Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) that purported to speak for the welfare of the overall international community grew and evolved to play a 
greater role in international affairs.
182
  Viewed from the prism of global welfare, the immorality and economic 
inefficiency of commercial corruption became self-evident.  In 1995, Transparency International
183
 began working 
with experts to issue the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) which ranks the level of corruption across 200 
countries.184  The CPI succeeded in drawing people’s attention to the issue of corruption and in convincing them of 
its deleterious effects.
185
  Additionally, the OECD made an effort to convince private actors of the significance of 
corporate ethics and perfect competition in the international marketplace.
186
  International banking organizations, 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), published stricter lending policies to enhance 
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organizational surveillance over the disbursement of funds to client countries.
187
  
Once attitudes towards commercial corruption changed, the evil of transnational bribery became self-evident.  
The U.S.’s initiative to outlaw transnational bribery was endorsed by IGOs and NGOs alike.188  For example, the 
U.N. issued General Assembly Resolution 51/59
189
 on December 12, 1996, and General Assembly Resolution 
51/191
190
 on December 16, 1996, which required member countries to “take effective and concrete action to combat 
all forms of corruption, bribery[,] and related illicit practices in international commercial transactions.”191  While 
domestic corruption in host countries was a global concern highlighted by IGOs, it was logical to establish the 
regulatory responsibility of countries home to multinational corporations.
192
  As Professor Tarullo opined, some 
political leaders of developing countries criticized European countries for their corporations’ acts of bribery that 
impeded their economic development and political integrity.
193
  
Within a political climate becoming increasingly intolerant of corruption, and during a time in which home 
countries were increasingly held responsible for regulatory oversight, European states had no reason to refuse the 
U.S.’s anti-bribery initiative.  For many European states, the negotiations with the U.S. were no longer a question of 
whether or not to outlaw transnational bribery, but a question of how and when.  
 
3.  U.S. ACHIEVEMENTS:  OECD CONVENTION AND OTHER AGREEMENTS 
During the 1990s, the U.S. was targeted at the Convention as the organizer of an anti-bribery collaboration.194  
Professor Mark Pieth summarized several reasons for why the U.S. chose the OECD as the coordinator.  First, the 
OECD was the best place to eliminate the side effects of the unilateral enforcement of the FCPA.
195
  As the OECD 
was comprised of major competitors of the U.S. in the overseas marketplace, an anti-bribery collaboration in this 
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arena obligated these competitors to regulate transnational bribery.
196
  It was the most efficient approach to cancel 
out the self-imposed cost of the FCPA.
197
  Second, OECD members were more economically motivated to accept an 
anti-bribery collaboration than other international organizations.
198
  In 1998, the total exports represented by the 
OECD members accounted for more than 75% of the global exporting industry.
199
  Corruption in the importing 
countries was more likely an impediment to business transactions and an additional expenditure that could have 
been avoided by collective action among regulatory states.
200
  Finally, the U.S. also counted on the OECD’s peer-
review monitoring system to ensure state compliance.
201
  
After years of negotiations, in 1994, the OECD released the Recommendation of the Council on Bribery in 
International Business Transactions (1994 Recommendation).
202
  This document officially required member states to 
criminalize transnational bribery.
203
  As a working document only applying to OECD member states, the 1994 
Recommendation was not legally binding, but it was the first declaratory statement to indicate that a global 
collective action against transnational bribery was on the way.
204
  Soon after the 1994 Recommendation’s 
publication, many agencies inside the OECD, like the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA), published special 
recommendations in support.
205
  In 1996, the OECD published another recommendation of the OECD Council on 
the Tax Deductibility of Bribes for Foreign Public Officials.
206
  Even though the U.S. took actions against the tax 
deductibility of transnational bribery in 1958, this was the first time it had been disallowed by an IGO.207  
Meanwhile, there was also progress in the EU and the OAS.  On September 27, 1996, the EU issued the first 
protocol to the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial Interests, which focused on 
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the issue of transnational bribery in Europe.
208
  On May 26, 1997, the Convention Against Corruption Involving 
Officials was adopted to “fight corruption involving European officials or national officials of Members States of the 
European Union.”209  This Convention required member countries to criminalize the payment and acceptance of 
bribes and other corrupt behaviors.
210
  In March of 1996, twenty-one members of the OAS signed the Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption, with the initiative to develop an enforcement regime against transnational 
corruption, establish a legal framework, and develop model laws.
211
 
On December 17, 1997, the text of the Convention was finalized, and on February 15, 1999, the Convention 
entered into force.
212
  By May of 2014, all signatories, including thirty-four OECD members and seven non-
members, ratified the Convention and incorporated its obligations into their national laws.
213
  The thirty-three 
original exporting countries that participated in the OECD anti-bribery conventions during the 1990s became the 
first generation of signatories of the OECD Convention.
214
   
 
a.  The Standard Rational Choice Account of the Convention and its Limits 
Given the U.S.’s central role in establishing the Convention, the functional mechanisms of U.S. strategies are 
critical to understanding its establishment.  Following the same logical line regarding the U.S.’s explanations in 
creating the FCPA, scholars adopted an interest-based, a value-based, or a combination approach to explain how U.S. 
strategies lead to a change of European attitudes toward the U.S. anti-bribery initiative.
215
  One popular interest-
based argument considers such an attitude change to be a rational response to U.S. provided external incentives and 
disincentives.
216
  Fitting within the rational choice tradition, existing academic and policy literature provide two 
explanations for the incentives and disincentives behind European attitude changes.  
The first explanation was a story about the U.S.’s threat of trade sanctions and the fact that they altered the 
                                                             
208 1996 O.J. (C 313) 1. 
209 1997 O.J. (C 195) 1. 
210 Id. at 4. 
211 Inter-American Convention against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, O.A.S.T.S. No. B-58. 
212 Convention, supra note 1, at 6, 40. 
213  OECD, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions: Ratification Status as of 21 May 2014 (May 21, 2014). 
214 The term “founders” is used to differentiate between the countries that participated in the original OECD anti-
bribery Convention negotiations and the countries that joined later. See id. 
215 Both the interest-based and the value-based explanations have followers.  In most situations, scholars blend the two 
approaches together.  See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 82, at 141–43.  See also Tarullo, supra note 146, at 693. 
216 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 82, at 141–42. 
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expected payoffs of European states, which thereby led to their attitude change regarding transnational bribery.
217
  
The U.S. saw the concession of European states as a strategic means to remove diplomatic pressure.
218
  Therefore, 
the fact that European states agreed to outlaw transnational bribery does not necessarily mean that they indeed want 
to enforce these laws.
219
  As Professor Tarullo suggests, “nothing in these explanations[,]” regarding “rational-choice 
premises” of how states entered into the agreement “in game theory[,] suggests that these governments intended the 
resulting Convention actually to repress overseas bribery.”220  
The second explanation told a story about the U.S. persuading European states as to the deleterious effects of 
transnational bribery on economic development.
221
  European states voluntarily took collective action against 
transnational bribery for a common pursuit of perfect competition and clearer international markets.
222
  The essence 
of the anti-bribery collaboration was a “public good” game that would produce common interests.223  Following this 
logic, the motives for signatories to legislate and enforce against transnational bribery were identical when they 
signed the Convention.  Although the two explanatory approaches predicted different prospects for the enforcement 
of the Convention and anti-bribery laws, they converged on the belief that European states agreed to establish the 
Convention for self-seeking purposes.   
Equally widespread was the value-based explanation, which describes European strategies as resulting from 
their commitment to an increasingly common value.
224
  European governments were convinced of the immorality of 
transnational bribery and established relevant anti-bribery institutions for moralism instead of self-interested 
purposes.
225
  With regard to the role of the U.S., this explanation supports that it was the U.S.’s normative persuasion 
instead of its economic leverage that mattered.
226
  
Categorizing the motives behind European governments changing their attitudes toward the U.S.’s anti-bribery 
initiative regarding interest and value-based reasons helps to identify multiple factors that may have fostered the 
Convention’s establishment.  However, the explanatory power of this distinction is limited due to the ambiguity 
                                                             
217 Tarullo, supra note 146, at 677-80. 
218 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 82, at 162–64. 
219  Tarullo, supra note 146, at 681. 
220 Id. 
221 See id. at 675–76. 
222 Id. at 681. 
223 Magnuson, supra note 114, at 376–78.  See Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism 
and National Climate Change Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 310 (2010). 
224 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 82, at 151–52.  
225 Id. at 160. 
226 See id. at 163–64. 
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between interests and values.  In international politics, it is indeed difficult to distinguish value-based purposes from 
interest-based purposes.  The value pursuit of state actors, if understood broadly, can be explained as a special 
manifestation of nonmaterial interests, or as an indicator of material interests in prospect.
227
  For example, the 
pursuit of fairness in international business competition could be considered a moral value and an effective market 
mechanism to pursue long-term economic interests.  Abbott and Snidal juxtaposed interests and values to analyze 
the operation of international legalization for clarity.
228
  However, they also stressed that “value considerations can 
often be understood in interest terms.”229  One particular example of this subject was the U.S.’s strategy of spurring 
public opinion, although it was not necessarily the triumph of value considerations over interest considerations.
230
  
European governments’ acknowledgement of public sentiments against transnational bribery can be embraced by a 
rational choice argument, as the governments needed to respond to domestic demands.  When Abbott and Snidal 
stressed the role of this strategy by stating that, “in the OECD, interest-based resistance to [antibribery] rules on the 
part of European governments was overcome only after the United States resorted to aggressive value tactics that 
mobilized domestic political pressure in Europe,” they only reconfirmed the difficulty in distinguishing between 
interests and values in international affairs.
231
  Because of the intertwined relationship between the two concepts, 
this binary explanation does not truly help discover more facts about how U.S. strategies lead to the attitude change 
of European states.  
These arguments, based on the binary opposition of self-interest and moral values, once more reflect the 
centrality of the rational choice analytical tradition, which assumes that variations in state strategies result from 
variations in payoff structures.
232
  Explaining European strategies as rationally resulting from an attempt to remove 
U.S. diplomatic pressure split the motives behind lawmaking and law enforcement.
233
  Any ineffectiveness of law 
enforcement became predictable due to the states never intending to take relevant laws seriously.
234
  Alternatively, 
explaining European strategies as rationally resulting from their pursuit of a common good (like perfect competition 
in overseas markets) presumes that they outlawed transnational bribery because they wanted to eliminate it.
235
  
                                                             
227 Id. at 146–47.  
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229 Id. at 143.  
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232 See id. at 152. 
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235 Id. at 667. 
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Accordingly, any unfavorable law enforcement could be considered to be a story about the “collective action 
problem,” “prisoner’s dilemma,” and “free riders.”236  Conventional explanations and solutions to the exploitability 
of individual contributions in cooperation would be available.  On the other hand, under the rationality assumption, a 
pure commitment to moralism or altruism constitutes an irrational strategy that would not go far.
237
  Therefore, 
explaining the attitude changes of European states as resulting from value motivations predicts a dismal outcome for 
law enforcement and makes explaining unfavorable enforcement of anti-bribery laws rather simple.  Thus, these 
arguments are set on the assumption that variations in payoff structures cause variations in strategies.  
This standard account, which explains the relationship between variations in state strategies and payoff 
structures, implies a direct cause and effect relationship between U.S. strategies and changed European government 
attitudes.  This simplifies the dynamic interactions between the U.S. and European governments and completely 
avoids the consideration of other IGOs’ relevance in international, political, and economic contexts.  In particular, 
the formation of the Convention was characterized by repeated consultations, negotiations, and concessions between 
U.S. and European states in successive stages.
238
  The negotiation would not succeed before a consensus was 
reached.
239
  These dynamic interactions among parties indicate that rational state actors should not only actively 
respond to incentives or disincentives in a given informational environment, but also be reactively bound by their 
actions in previous rounds of negotiations.240  After this happens, the path dependency rationale normally enters.241  
From an overall standpoint, state actors’ attempts to maximize their self-interest might be consistent, but their 
strategies were highly unlikely to produce intended results.  The existence of a direct cause and effect relationship 
between U.S. strategies and attitude changes of European governments distorted the analysis of the real dynamics  
surrounding the formation of the Convention.
242
  
 
B.  THE CONVENTION AS AN OUTCOME OF A CHAIN REACTION INITIATED BY THE U.S. 
                                                             
236 Branislav Hock, Intimations of Global Anti-Bribery Regime and the Effectiveness of Extraterritorial Enforcement: 
From Free-Riders to Protectionism? (Aug. 2013) (unpublished Master thesis, Tilburg University School of Law) (on file with 
Tilburg University). 
237 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 82, at 155–57.  
238 See generally ABBOTT & SNIDAL, supra note 86, at 20–36 (detailing the events and time periods surrounding the 
Convention’s creation). 
239 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 82, at 168. 
240 See id. at 148–49.  
241 See ABBOTT & SNIDAL, supra note 86, at 7. 
242 Id. at 162.  
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To understand the U.S.’s role in the negotiations, this subsection focuses on two key points.  The first is the 
gradual attitude change of European governments in successive episodes of negotiations.  The second is how their 
optimal strategies in each episode were limited by accessible information and their prior decisions.  
Let us contrast the story of the Convention’s formation with the FCPA’s creation once more.  The Watergate 
scandal and subsequent SEC disclosure programs brought transnational bribery into public view, and thus aroused 
divergent interest demands from different domestic groups around the issue.
243
  This was the prerequisite for any 
discussions on legislative remedies.  In the case of the Convention, the U.S. exogenously brought the issue of 
transnational bribery to the international level.
244
  With aggressive political and economic strategies, European 
governments had this issue imposed upon them and were therefore forced to address the legal status of transnational 
bribery.
245
  
In the case of the FCPA, the U.S.’s passing of legislation against transnational bribery was a gradual 
reinforcement and popularization of an unexpressed societal value:  the evil of transnational bribery.
246
  Similarly, 
European governments’ acceptance of anti-bribery terms in trade treaties, despite the limited political influence and 
binding force of these terms, was an official endorsement of the illegality of transnational bribery.  This sense of 
value was further reinforced in the international ideological atmosphere that increasingly grew against corruption.
247
  
European governments had no excuse to give an overall denial of the U.S. anti-bribery initiative.  Once they entered 
into negotiations about how to establish an anti-bribery collaboration, they knew they could not go back.
248
  After 
the negotiations, there was no longer a question of whether to establish an agreement, but a question of how and 
when to establish the agreement.  
Following the negotiations, all the parties began to work towards a common goal.  By now, in terms of 
understanding the dynamics surrounding the Convention’s formation, an observation of what European governments 
intended, yet failed to achieve, is highly relevant.  It is noteworthy that European governments once suggested a 
draft agreement that only criminalized their nationals’ acts of paying bribes in only the states that were parties to the 
                                                             
243 See Koehler, supra note 40, at 932–33, 939–41.  
244 Magnuson, supra note 114, at 386. 
245 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 82, at 162–63. 
246 Davis, Moralism, supra note 16, at 501.  
247 See ABBOTT & SNIDAL, supra note 86, at 29.  
248  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 82, at 167–68.  See Peter J. Boettke, Cristopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson, 
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agreement.
249
  This meant that if host countries did not outlaw their own companies’ transnational bribery acts 
abroad, then they would not prohibit their corporations from paying bribes in those host countries.
250
  For example, a 
German company that paid bribes to a Canadian official (a member country) would constitute an offense under 
German law, but paying bribes to an official of India (a nonmember country) would not.  Essentially, it was a 
scheme that determined the liability of bribe-paying corporations according to the nationalities of the bribe payees.  
The underlying logic implied that to European governments, transnational bribery was an offense to the welfare of 
host countries rather than the home countries of bribe payers or business competitors.  Their prohibition of 
transnational bribery was an altruistic action that would benefit others.  However, they tended to only offer this 
advantage in a mutually beneficial manner to those who provided the same advantage to them.  
For Europe, this scheme was already sufficient to coordinate the demands of all parties.  First, this approach was 
expected to level the playing field for overseas business competition and remove diplomatic pressure from the U.S. 
on European governments.
251
  Second, declaring an attitude to combat transnational bribery was expected to help 
appease the sentiments of European citizens.
252
  Third, as it prohibited corporations from paying bribes in member 
states, it was expected to cut one channel of importing bribes and to keep corruption outside their boundaries.
253
  
Meanwhile, since it did not prohibit corporations from paying bribes in nonmember states, which were often 
assumed to be more corrupt developing countries, they did not need to waste judicial resources and risk their 
business opportunities to fight with the cultures of outsider countries.
254
  
However, the draft agreement was destined to be rebuffed.  As noted in the story behind the FCPA’s enactment, 
lawmaking is not only supposed to coordinate interest demands of different parties, but also serve a normative 
function to define right and wrong behaviors.
255
  The baseline that delimits the lawmaking is that it cannot expressly 
or inferably go against the public values of society.  For the general public, the criminalization of transnational 
bribery signaled that it was an action morally wrong and legally forbidden.  The draft treaty, which conditionally 
prohibited transnational bribery according to the place of occurrence, violated the tenet of rule of law.  Consequently, 
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the Convention entailed a complete prohibition of transnational corporate bribery.
256
  
After the passing of the Convention, it was clear that its formation was an activity initiated by the U.S. and 
participated in by European states and several other countries.  The U.S. did not construct the Convention and press 
it upon other states straightforwardly, but was more likely an actor that brought the topic of regulating transnational 
bribery into international arenas and mobilized latent values in a well-fermented, ideological atmosphere in the early 
1990s.  Once the tap of value was opened, it caused a domino effect and made it unwise for states in the midst of 
negotiation to resist.  Even though the U.S. initiated the process with European governments, it cannot be 
completely attributed to them because the Convention became a different model from the FCPA.  For this reason, I 
label this dynamic process of the formation of the Convention and the anti-bribery collaboration as an exogenously 
induced model of institutional establishment.  
 
IV.  THE POST-CONVENTION ERA:  “OECD-DOMINATED” INSTITUTIONAL EXPANSION TO NON-
COLLABORATORS 
This part analyzes the dynamic of the further expansion of the community of collaborators in the post-
Convention era.  Due to the power of existing collaborators and the popularization of the notion that transnational 
bribery is evil, the interactive model between collaborators and non-collaborators was structured fairly simply.  
Furthermore, this model can be summarily characterized by rational choice decision making.  
 
A.  AN ATTEMPT BY EXISTING COLLABORATORS TO EXPAND THE COMMUNITY 
The creation of the Convention indicated that thirty-four countries, representing approximately three-fourths of 
global exports,
257
 would criminalize transnational bribery.  In order to expand the community of collaborators, the 
OECD Working Group on Bribery (WGB) never stopped recruiting nonmembers, who represented the remaining 
one-fourth of global exports and stood beyond the arrangement of the Convention.  
Article 13 of the Convention explains that it is “open to accession by any non-signatory which is a member of 
the OECD or has become a full participant in the Working Group on Bribery in International Business 
                                                             
256 Abbott and Snidal explained it as an effect of the indivisibility of values.  See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 82, at 
167–68.  
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Transactions.”258  Apart from Article 13, relevant efforts can be traced back to the 1994 Recommendation, which 
encouraged member countries to recruit more members.
259
  In the 1996 Tax Deductibility Recommendation, two 
OECD agencies were required to promote the application of relevant regulatory instruments by making contact with 
non-member states.
260
  In November 2004, the WGB issued a questionnaire to assess non-member states’ 
applications for participation and accession to the 1997 Anti-Bribery Convention.
261
  
 
B.  A HISTORICAL REVIEW:  OECD EFFORTS TO EXPAND THE COMMUNITY OF COLLABORATORS 
1.  OECD EFFORTS TO RECRUIT NEW MEMBERS INTO THE CONVENTION 
  There were twenty-nine OECD member states and five non-member states (the Slovak Republic, Chile, 
Argentina, Brazil, and Bulgaria) that signed the Convention in 1997.
262
  By 2013, another six states participated in 
the Convention:  Slovenia, Estonia, South Africa, Israel, Russia, and Colombia.
263
  As the timing and motivations of 
these signatories were different from those of the first generation of signatories, I refer to these six states as second-
generation signatories.  
A general approach of the OECD was to set membership within the Convention as a basic condition of 
admission for second-generation signatories.
264
  Slovenia was one of the first new signatories to the Convention in 
2010.
265
  It submitted its application for membership to the  WGB in 2000, became a party to the Convention in 
2001, and became a full member of the OECD in 2010.266  Estonia was another new signatory to the Convention, 
joining in 2004,
267
 and joining the OECD on December 9, 2010.
268
  South Africa participated in the Convention in 
                                                             
258 Convention, supra note 1, at 7.   
259 OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Bribery in International Business Transactions, C(94)75/FINAL (July 
11, 1994). 
260  OECD, Recommendation of the Council on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials, 
C(96)27/FINAL (Apr. 17, 1996).  
261 OECD, Working Grp. on Bribery in Int’l Bus. Transactions (Inv. Comm.), Questionnaire to Countries Seeking 
Participation in the Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions and Accession to the OECD Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, DAFFE/IME/BR/WD(2004)9, (Nov. 3, 
2004). 
262OECD, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
and Related Instruments, available at http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/2406452.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
263Annual Report, supra note 14, at 44.  
264 Id.  
265  Slovenia signed the Convention on July 21, 2010.  Slovenia’s Accession to the OECD, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/slovenia/sloveniasaccessiontotheoecd.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
266  OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions: 
Ratification Status as of 21 May 2014, supra note 213. 
267 Id. 
268OECD, Steps taken to implement and enforce the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
60                               SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF            [Vol. 11.1 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS 
 
2007 but has not yet fully joined the organization.
269
  In May 2007, the OECD Council stepped into negotiations 
with Chile, Estonia, Israel, Russia, and Slovenia.
270
  For Israel and Russia, which were not signatories to the 
Convention, the OECD Council suggested that one basic condition for their accession to the OECD was their 
participation in the Convention.
271
  Israel formally applied for membership in the WGB in February 2008, ratified 
the Convention in 2009,
272
 and became a full member of the OECD in September 2010.
273
  Russia formally applied 
for WGB membership in February 2009 and became a signatory to the Convention in 2012.
274
  Colombia submitted 
its application for the membership to the Convention in 2011, and became a signatory in 2013.
275
  
Basically, a rational choice analysis grasps the motivation behind this second generation of signatories in 
joining the collective action, since most of the second-generation signatories are states from the EU and Latin 
America where regional anti-bribery treaties were already created.
276
  These states also have close political and 
economic interdependence with first-generation signatories, which attributed to their signing of the Convention.  
Because of their frequent interactions and contacts, the first-generation signatories are definitely powerful enough to 
popularize the Convention terms to those states.  Precisely for this reason, the first and second generations of 
signatories are mainly comprised of traditional industrialized states, as well as some other EU and OAS states, 
which can use their political and economic leverage to press the Convention terms.  However, for those politically 
and economically remote and independent from the existing signatories (especially emerging Asian economies), the 
major method adopted by the WGB to reach these states is to strengthen contacts between them and existing 
signatories.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Officials in International Business Transactions: Estonia, (Sep. 17, 2008) available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
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bribery/anti-briberyconvention/42103193.pdf.  
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272 OECD, Directorate for Fin. and Enter. Affairs, Israel: Phase 1 Review of Implementation of the Convention and 
1997 Revised Recommendation, at 4, (Mar. 19, 2009). 
273 OECD Working Group on Bribery Annual Report 2008, supra note 271, at 3.  
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http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/russia-oecdanti-briberyconvention.htm. 
275 See OECD, Columbia – OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/colombia-oecdanti-
briberyconvention.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).  For information about how the abovementioned states participated in the 
OECD, see OECD, supra note 268. 
276 Spahn, supra note 15, at 29–30.  
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2.  OECD EFFORTS TO COLLABORATE WITH NON-MEMBERS 
The WGB is actively working with non-signatories and seeking to popularize the anti-corruption standards to a 
wider arena.
277
  As noted previously, in May of 2007 the OECD Council began negotiations with Russia and four 
other countries regarding OECD membership.
278
  During this time, the OECD organized a program of “enhanced 
engagement” to China, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Brazil, attempting to seek stronger ties and to explore the 
possibility of recruitment.
279
 
Because these states enjoy more economic independence than the second-generation signatories, the traditional 
approach of imposing group pressure through the EU or OAS would not work.  Essentially, it is not quite effective 
enough to popularize the Convention terms by imposing trade sanctions and policies alike.  However, with the 
acceleration of global economic integration, both signatories and non-signatories exist in a large international 
network.  With an increasingly greater number of international organizations initiating actions against corruption, the 
depth and breadth of international cooperation has expanded.  It is possible for existing signatories, the stronger 
power in international economic affairs, to impose a “soft pressure” on non-signatories in other occasions where the 
non-signatories have a membership (like in the G20, the U.N., and the World Trade Organization (WTO)).
280
  
One exemplary case of the soft pressure was the G20.  The G20 is the premier forum for international 
cooperation in economic affairs and consists of the EU and nineteen states.
281
  Sixteen of these states are either full 
OECD members or have participated in the Convention.  Therefore, it is possible for them to disseminate the spirit 
of the Convention and exert influence over non-signatory countries.  In 2010, the G20 adopted an Anti-Corruption 
Action Plan, which called for all G20 countries to adopt and enforce laws and related measures to combat 
transnational bribery, and to keep close contact with the WGB.
282
  One consequence of the G20’s influence was that 
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in 2011, China amended its penal code to criminalize transnational bribery.
283
  
 
C.  THE EXPANSION OF THE COLLABORATION:  ANTI-BRIBERY INSTITUTIONS IMPOSED ON NON-COLLABORATORS BY 
EXISTING COLLABORATORS 
The popularization of the Convention’s terms in the 2000s and 2010s was most likely a result of the powerful 
political and economic leverage from first-generation signatories.  After the creation of the Convention, these 
signatories, together with IGOs, NGOs, and International Financial Organizations (IFOs), established an 
international network which constantly squeezed the space of dissidents, both morally and materially.284  On one 
hand, they used a normative persuasion strategy to make the deleterious effects of transnational bribery an 
indisputable belief.  The value of the collective delegitimization of transnational bribery has gradually become 
common sense.  Furthermore, the existing signatories to the Convention, together with IGOs, NGOs, and IFOs, have 
powerful economic leverage in international affairs.  Such signatories, especially those who have close economic 
ties with collaborators elsewhere, are able to alter the payoff structure of non-collaborators and press the Convention 
terms upon them in a more efficient fashion.  Although many emerging economies that represent an increasingly 
large share of the international commerce presently stand out of the Convention, we have the evidence to predict that 
the coverage of the Convention terms will continue to increase.   
On the other hand, the participation of non-member countries in the Convention, or acceptance of the 
Convention’s terms, is not out of indigenous needs but is instead an approach they must follow for dialogue with 
other players in the international arena.  Since non-member countries are less equipped to control corruption and are 
less active in the international marketplace, they are not as sensitive to the deleterious effects of transnational bribery 
when compared to traditionally industrialized countries.  This is because traditionally industrialized countries have 
accumulated effective anti-corruption techniques and have played a significant role in international markets over the 
past century.  Instead, non-member countries acceptance of the Convention’s terms is more likely a result of 
diplomatic considerations.  Compared with the endogenous creation of the FCPA in 1977 and the exogenously 
induced formation of the Convention by first-generation signatories in the 1990s, the expansion of the community of 
collaborators was completely exogenously initiated and dominated.  
                                                             
283 Samuel R. Gintel, Fighting Transnational Bribery: China’s Gradual Approach, 31 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1, 1 (2013). 
284 Indira Carr & Opi Outhwaite, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Combating Corruption: 
Theory and Practice, 44(3) SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 615, 615–19 (2011).  
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V.  INSTITUTIONALIZING THE COLLABORATION:  AN EVOLUTIONARY EVENT DEFINED BY PATH 
DEPENDENCE 
Preceding sections have sketched out three phases of institutional development of the anti-bribery collaboration.  
Essentially, the dynamics of the institutionalization process can be categorized into three modes:  the endogenously 
created mode, which characterizes the enactment of the FCPA by the U.S. in a context where there were no 
precedents or external interventions in the 1970s; the exogenously induced mode, which characterizes the formation 
of the OECD Convention in the 1990s; and the exogenously dominated mode, which characterized the expansion of 
the community of collaborators in the post-Convention era.  Like any others, the inaccuracy of this categorizing is 
self-evident as it is probable that some founders of the Convention in the 1990s were exogenously motivated to 
participate in the collaboration.  Nevertheless, we can view the institutional development of the collaboration 
broadly as primarily being the product of endogenous or exogenous factors in each of the three phases.  Now we are 
in a position to address the central puzzle of this Article:  What is the fundamental rationale that defines the dynamic 
process of the institutionalization of the anti-bribery collaboration from the FCPA to the post-Convention stories?  
At the outset of the Article, I specified that the objective of this analysis is not limited to tell a detailed story of 
how each signatory was motivated to participate in the collaboration, but also to provide a progressive manner of 
understanding a very current topic:  the practical effect of the Convention.  Standard accounts in previous works, 
which employed the rational choice theory to explain the motives of states to participate in the collaboration, have 
followed this tradition to make assumptions on, and give explanations of, state compliance with the Convention at 
the present stage.
285
  This standard account is functionally flawed because it does not fully explain why a given 
country outlawed and enforced against transnational bribery.  However, given the deep embedment of this 
interpretative logic in the thinking of scholars, practitioners, and ordinary people, we cannot fully lay bare its limits 
without penetrating deeply into its structural defects.  Therefore, in the following subsections I will extract the 
fundamental rationale behind the argument of the historical approach of this Article, and contrast it with the rationale 
behind the standard rational choice account.  
 
 
                                                             
285 See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of 
Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367, 367–71 (1998). 
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A.  THE RELEVANCE OF PATH DEPENDENCE TO THE WHOLE STORY 
The explanation of the three phases’ institutional development have suggested that the dynamic process of the 
institutionalization of the anti-bribery collaboration is not simply characterized by free will choices and the self-
seeking intentions of state actors.  It is also characterized by the constraints on the free will choices and self-seeking 
intentions of state actors imposed by the established institutions.  Basically, it presents a dynamic of institutional 
path dependence.  
Generally, a dynamic of path dependence implies that “history matters” and highlights that, as Scott Page states, 
“[c]urrent and future states, actions, or decisions depend on the path of previous states, actions[,] or decisions.”286  
Regarding this topic, it captures how factors like the established value system of the society (a condemnation of 
corruption) and political structure of the community (the relationship between the U.S. government and Congress, 
and the relationship between U.S., European governments, and International Organizations) defined the way states 
interacted and reshaped their expectations.  It also explains how these interactions created new institutions (e.g. a 
moral condemnation of transnational bribery) and then systematically drove forward the institutionalization of the 
anti-bribery collaboration.  If the standard rational choice account tells a story of how free will actors sought self-
interest maximization in a given informational environment, this argument tells a story of how actors’ free will to 
seek self-maximization in each given informational environment is locked in a trajectory, defined by the established 
and evolving institutional context.
287
  In contrast to the standard rational choice account, which is ahistorical and 
explains the dynamic of institutionalization as a natural result of the free will and rationality of state actors, the 
argument of this article is historical and explains the dynamic of institutionalization as a result of the constraints of 
historical forces on the same.  
While the principle of path dependence defined the basic trajectory of interactions among different actors 
throughout the whole story, there is a set of operative factors that defined the content and the pattern of their 
interactions in each episode of building central institutions of the anti-bribery collaboration.  The following 
subsection outlines how these operative factors performed their functions in each phase of the institutionalization 
process and brought about relevant institutions.  
                                                             
286 Scott E. Page, Path Dependence, 1 Q. J. OF POL. SCI. 87, 88 (2006). 
287 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1990).  
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B.  KEY OPERATIVE FACTORS IN EACH PHASE 
1.  AN INITIATOR OF THE DISCUSSION 
A logical prerequisite of official discussion regarding the disposal of transnational bribery is that something 
brings the subjective matter onto the conference table.  It could take place independently of any political forces’ 
conscious arrangements.  For example, the discussion on whether to enact the FCPA in the U.S. was initiated by the 
Watergate scandal and post-Watergate SEC disclosure programs. 288   Certain political forces could have also 
consciously pursued it.  For instance, the U.S. government actively initiated international discussion in establishing 
the Convention.  The post-Convention story becomes even more straightforward.  The WGB, as the coordinator of 
the collaboration and the representative of existing collaborators, became the initiator of discussion with non-
collaborators regarding the proposal of outlawing transnational bribery in those countries.
289
  My categorization of 
the three phases of the institutionalization in preceding sections is correct according to the origins of the initiators of 
the three phases’ stories and their control over the whole event. 
Regardless of the beginning of the stories, once the subject matter was brought into public discussion it was 
locked in a trajectory and defined by existing institutional settings of the community.  For the issue of transnational 
bribery, once it was open to public discussion its incompatibility with democratic values and its illegality became 
self-evident.  Different stakeholder groups further discussed this concept by expressing their own expectations 
regarding transnational bribery.  Consequently, the immorality of transnational bribery was transformed from a 
latent value of the society into an express one.  A similar story took place in the formation of the Convention.  The 
U.S. consciously brought the issue of transnational bribery into international forums.  Despite the early unpopularity 
of the idea that transnational bribery was evil, the conventional condemnation of corruption and recent globalization 
determined that the evil of transnational bribery would be transformed from a U.S. value to a global value.  
 
2.  DIVERGENT INTEREST DEMANDS OF PARTIES AND THE COORDINATION FUNCTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
Once discussion on whether to legislate against transnational bribery began, all involved stakeholders would 
have an interest demand and would try to maximize the benefits from the outcome.  Soon after, there would be a 
                                                             
288 See Davis, Moralism, supra note 16, at 498–99. 
289 See Ben Heineman, Jr. & Fritz Heimann, The Long War Against Corruption, 85(3) FOREIGN AFF. 75, 80–86 (2006). 
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need to coordinate the preferences of these parties to an effective equilibrium.  As noted above, the coordination 
function of the institutional arrangement is a key operative factor that clearly distinguishes the argument of this 
Article from that of the standard rational choice account.   
Under the rubric of state anthropomorphization, it is assumed that different interest demands regarding an event 
have common values.  These values are constant across the community and allow anthropomorphized state actors to 
work out an optimal strategy by trading off conflicting interests.
290
  In contrast, this article emphasizes that the 
interest preferences of parties involved in the negotiations were likely divergent, and these parties had roughly equal 
discursive powers in the negotiations.  As the values of different interest demands were different in the eyes of 
separate parties, it would be impossible to trade them off in a mathematical model.  The only feasible approach was 
to encourage negotiations, concessions, or even side payments to reach a position.  It is noteworthy that this 
argument does not assert that a dynamic of trading off conflicting interests is irrelevant to this subject matter; on the 
contrary, a dynamic of trading off conflicting interests precisely grasps the story of the post-Convention era.  What I 
argue is that the relevance of the dynamic of trading off conflicting interests is conditional and only applies to 
subdominant parts of the overall story.  
Furthermore, as the coordination theory can accommodate variations and individual strategies in an 
informational context, it gives a more accurate explanation of long stories with a set of episodes and interactions 
among parties than does a rational choice account.  The application of the rational choice account is limited to a 
given informational environment.  When information is accessible and the optimizing manner of individual actors is 
controlled, the optimal strategies for actors are deterministic.  However, across a long story with successive episodes 
of interactions, accessible information changes, payoff structures change, and the optimal choices for actors change 
therewith.  As an individual actor’s intention to optimize its strategy continues, the subsequent optimal choices 
become profoundly discontinuous.  This is where a long story fails the rational choice accounts, much like the 
negotiation for the Convention.  The negotiations between the U.S. and European governments failed in the 1970s 
and in the 1980s, because the European pursuit to prohibit transnational bribery during that time was inconsistent 
with the goals of the U.S.
291
  However, in the 1990s, as new economic pursuits were chased, domestic public 
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291 See Pieth, supra note 85; Glynn et al., supra note 90, at 22. 
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opinions changed, and the evil of transnational bribery became an increasingly popular concept.
292
  This altered the 
informational environment for European governments and reshaped their optimal choices in each episode of 
negotiation.
293
  Eventually, though the intention of Europeans to maximize their own welfare might have been the 
same as in the beginning, their optimal choices had become compatible with those of the U.S., which laid the 
groundwork for establishing an agreement.  
 
3.  THE NORMATIVE FUNCTION OF LAW THAT DELIMITS THE MORAL BOUNDARIES OF INSTITUTIONS 
Another operative factor is the normative function of law, which delimits the moral boundaries of legislative 
activities.
294
  Law, as the most important form of institution in our social life, also performs a responsibility of 
defining and encouraging morally correct behaviors.
295
  Therefore, lawmaking is strictly bound to moral correctness.  
It can never explicitly or implicitly encourage established values of a society.  Therefore, the original versions, 
which reflect the optimal coordination equilibrium of interest demands of stakeholders, should be amenable to these 
moral boundaries.  Once necessary, the moral relevance of law would sacrifice the optimal equilibrium of interest 
demands for moral values.  It shapes the final outcome of coordination in successive episodes of the 
institutionalization of the global anti-bribery collaboration.  
It is now clear that the dynamic of the institutionalization of the anti-bribery collaboration, as an evolutionary 
event from the FCPA to the expansion of the community of collaborators in the post-Convention era, was defined by 
the constraining forces of established institutions and the inherent functions of laws.  Following this thought process, 
regular interactions between political forces, which perform in a strictly optimizing manner may result in altruistic 
consequences across negotiations in an evolutionary context.  The standard rational choice argument, that this 
process is defined by an unchanging optimizing manner of state actors and a course of trading off conflicting 
interests, completely overlooked both the divergence of interest demands of independent parties in negotiations and 
how variations in informational environment reshapes optimal choices across negotiation.  
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
A simple conclusion of this Article is that the dynamic process of the institutionalization of the anti-bribery 
collaboration cannot be well understood without paying close attention to the intertwined interactions among 
political forces in the historical context.  The analysis of this Article reveals that a simple economic approach cannot 
give an accurate explanation of the dynamic of the institutionalization process because it fails to account for the 
constraints on discontinuous individual strategies imbedded in an incrementally evolving institutional context.  Our 
collective social life is path dependent, and so is the academic analysis.  At the macro level it is the continuity and 
evolvability of the institutional context, rather than the unchanging utility function of state choices, that provides a 
better nexus for academic analysis of the operation of the anti-bribery collaboration in successive stages. 
